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Governance and anarchy in the 
s. 2(b) jurisprudence: A comment on 
Vancouver Sun and Harper v. Canada 
.Jamie Cameron· 
1. GOVERNANCE ANO ANARCHY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISION MAKING 
A bi polar conceplion of the guarantee has rcsullcd in rnntradiclions 
and double s tandards, which are the defi ning features or the Supreme 
Coun's seclion 2(b) j urisprudence. Rather than break il, the Court 's 
decisions in Vancouver Sun, Re 1 and Harper v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral)2 confirm a pallern in which a model o r governance co-cx isls with 
methodological anarchy of sons. Governance, in this paper, refers Lo a 
syslcm or rules or principles thal direct and regulate decision maki ng 
from one case lo the next. Absent a system, lhc section 2(b) j urisprudence 
is capricious, and a caplive of instincts which shift from j udge to j udge, 
case lo case, and issue to issue. If anarchistic is harsh, it nonetheless 
describes a resu lt-based jurisprudence which lacks the discipline of 
princ ipled adj udication. While Vancouver Sun fits the governance 
* Protcssor, Osgoodc Hall Law School. 
(2004), [20041 2 S.C.R. 332, [2004] S.C.J. No. 4 1, 2004 CarswellBC 1376, 
2004 CarswcllBC 1377. 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 26 1, 120 C. R.R. (2cl) 203, [2005] 2 
W . W .R. 671. (sub nom. Applica1io11 Under Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code, 
Re) 322 N.R. 16 1, 2 1 C.R. (6th) 142, (sub norn. R. v. llagri) 184 C.C.C. (3d) 
5 15, (sub norn. R. v. Bagri) 240 D.L.R. (4th) 147, (sub nom. App/ica1ion Under 
Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re) 199 B.C.A.C. I , 2004 SCC43 (S.C.C.). 
2 r20041 I S.C.R. 827, f2004] S.C.J. No. 28, 2004 CarswellAlla 646, 2004 
Carswel1A lla647, 239 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 11 9 C.R.R. (2d) 84, 348 A.R. 201,32! 
W.A.C. 201, L200418 W.W.R. I , 27 Alta. L.R. (4th) I, 2004 SCC33, 320 N.R. 
49 (S.C.C.). 
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model, Hwper v. Canada (Auom ey General) is an example of resull-
driven decision making. 
Not long afler it saved campaign spending limits in Harper,l the 
Supreme Court concluded lhat a prcsumplion of openness applies lo 
investigalivc hearings that are inilialed under Parliamenl's anti -terror 
lcgislation.4 Aller upholding the provision in a companion case,.~ a ma-
jority led a second time by deparling Justices Iacobucci and A rbour 
applied the presumption to investigative hearings under section 83.28, 
and set a high threshold for derogations from the open court principle.6 
In doing so the joint opinion was unsympathetic to the argumc111 that 
the presumption shou ld be displaced, either because lhesc proceedings 
arc investigal ivc or because the hearings are a vital clement in Parlia-
ment's li ght against terrorism. The judges found instead that the same 
standard applies to lhis prov ision as lo derogations from open court in 
other scttings.7 Vancouver Sun is a model of governance in constitutional 
adjudication because principle prevai led over lhe claim thal the Coun 
3 Tile Canada Elections Act ("'C.E.A."'), S.C. 2000, c . 9, s. 350 limi t:. thi ru pully 
election advcrti5ing to $3.000.00 per electoral district and $ 150,000.00 nation-
ally. 
4 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985. c. C-46, s. 83.28 (The Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 
200 1. c. 4 1). 
5 AJ1plica1ion Under s. 83.28 of 1/ie Criminal Code, Re (2004), 2004 SCC 42, 
120041 S.C.J . No. 40, 2004 Carswell BC 1378, 2004 CarswellBC 1379. 120041 
2 S.C.R. 248, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 195, 12 1 C. R.R. (2d) I, [2005J 2 W.W.R. 605, 
2 1 C. R. (6th) 82, 322 N.R. 205, (sub no m. R. v. 8ugri) 184 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 
(sub 110 111. R. v. Bagri) 240 D.L.R. (4th) 81, 199 B.C.A.C. 45 (S.C.C.). 
6 Va11co11ver S1111, supra, note I. 
1 Sec Dagenais 1•. Canadian fJroadcasting Corp., [1994) 3 S.C.R. 835, 1994 
Can.wcllOnt I 12, 1994 CarswcllOm I 168, [ 1994 f S.C.J. No. I 04, 34 C.R. (4th) 
269. 20 0.R. (3d) 8 16 (note). 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12. 175 N.R. I , 94 C.C.C. (3d) 
289, 76 0.A.C. 8 1, 25 C.R.R. (2d) I. 1994 SCC 102 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Me11111ck 
(2001), 1200113S.C.R.442. 200 I CarswellMan 535, 2001 Carswell Man 536, 
[200 I ] S.C.J . No. 73, 2001 sec 76. 158 c.c.c. (3d) 449. 205 D .L.R. (4th) 5 12. 
47 C.R. (5th) 63. 277 N.R. 160. f2<Xl2 I 2 W. W.R. 409, 163 Man. R. (2d) I , 269 
W.A.C. I (S.C.C.). Under that test, exceptions are permissible when: 
(a) such an order is necessary in ordcn o prevelll a serious risk LO the proper 
administration o f j ustice because reasonably alternat ive measures will 
not prevent the risk; and 
(b) the salutary effects o f the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects 
on the r ights and interests or the panics and the publi t:, including the 
effect:. on the 1ig ht to free cxp1c:.:.io n, the right o f the accused to a fair 
and pub lic trial, and the cfli cacy or the administration o f just ice. 
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should defer to the state's assessment of strategy in the war on terrorism, 
including the need for secret investigative hearings. 
For these reasons, Vancouver Sun represents a high waler mark for 
1hc open court principle. The decision is yet more remarkable when 
j uxtaposed wich Harper which, almost simultaneously, defined a new 
low point in the section 2(b) j urisprudence. There, the Court upheld 
Parliament's limits on th ird party advertising.11 In doing so, the majority 
opinion could not save the restriction without <lcpari:ing from its own 
case law on participation in the democratic process. BastaraeheJ. upheld 
the legislation because he and other members in the majority agreed that 
third parties should not have a credible voice in election debate. The 
resul t was anan.:histic, in this paper's sense of the word, because Harper 
v. Canada (Attorney General) resisted section 2(b)'s values, as well as 
the evidentiary requirements of section I, to uphold provisions that 
effectively exclude citizens from the democratic process. 
A comparison of these cases con firms the presence or double stan-
dards in the section 2(b) j urisprudence. For instance, after applying a 
low standard of justification in Hmper, the Court set a high threshold 
for l imits on the open court principle in Vancouver Sun. Both l imes the 
expressive activity was al the core or lhc guarantee, but while the Court 
deferred lo Parl iament on the quest ion of third party spending, it refused 
to grant the same latitude to Lhe government's claim thal proceedings 
under section 83.28 must be conducted in secret. M oreover, access was 
at the heart in both cases. While the issue in Harper was one of access 
to the electoral process and the right lo participate in the election debate, 
the secrecy order::; challenged in Vancouver Sun denied the public access 
Lo information about the existence of an investigati ve hearing into ter-
rorist. activities. [n fact, the argument for an exception Lo the open court 
principle was stronger in Vancouver Sun than Lhe evidence of reasonable 
limits was in Harper. Whereas Vancouver Sun followed the model of 
governance the Court had devel oped in the open court contex t, Haq1er 
ignored the evidence and demands or principle to uphold Ii mils which 
failed establ ished standards of constitutional adjudication. And that, as 
chis paper will show, is the difference bc1wecn governance or principle-
hased decision making, and anarchy, or rcsult-hased adjudication. 
This paper develops these themes by commenting on the two deci-
sions. From the perspecti ve of Vancouver Sun, the first section explains 
why the open court jurisprudence is a section 2(b) success story. Perhaps 
for that reason, this part of the paper is brief in comparison wi th i ts next 
8 Suwa, nolc 2. 
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section, which focuses on Harper v. Canada (Attorney General). The 
discussion of Harper begins by reviewing the Court's decisions on 
participation in the democratic process. Doing so reveals that the ma-
jority opinion in Harper avoided the force of precedent to uphold the 
C.E.A. 's third party spending limits. Then, an analysis of the majority 
opinion shows how it also ignored established principle and abandoned 
the requirement that limits on the Charter's guarantees be justified by 
evidence. 
Though an unfavourable assessment of Harper is unavoidable, the 
paper's purposes are positive, rather than negative. A final section re-
turns to a comparison between these two approaches to adjudication 
under section 2(b). As Harper shows, the Court's decisions on certain 
questions too often abandon principle in favour of unspoken assumptions 
about the relative value of the expressive activity in question; instincts 
about whether and to what extent the activity is "harmful"; a rough 
calculus of whether the limit on expressive freedom is too unforgiving 
to be saved under section l; and a political calculus of whether deference 
is appropriate, either to divert institutional criticism or to forestall a 
confrontation with Parliament. This paper suggests that the Court can 
avoid the anarchy of result-based adjudication by adapting and applying 
the open court model to other section 2(b) issues. Not only would the 
adoption of a governance-based approach address the problem of double 
standards and promote consistency, it would ensure that limits on section 
2(b) activity arc based on the evidence and not on subjective perceptions 
about the expressive activity at stake and its relative value. Having 
explained that the open court jurisprudence provides a model, the last 
section also indicates how its key clements can be adapted and applied 
to other branches of the case law, to avoid the anarchy which is all too 
often indicative of a result-based approach to decision making. 
2. RE VANCOUVER SUN 
(a) The Open Court Principle: A section 2(b) Success Story 
The open court jurisprudence is a section 2(b) success story because 
the Court developed a principled model or system of governance in this 
setting, which it faithfully applies to these issues. The jurisprudence is 
described here as a success story because the Court's methodology 
protects the principle's underlying values but permits exceptions when 
the circumstances at hand meet the model's standard of justification. An 
approach that focuses attention on the relationship between principle 
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and the evidence in particu lar cases oners a model for adjudication which 
should be followed on other issues. Vancouver Sun is the most recent in 
a series or decisions that exemplify this approach to open court under 
the Charier. 
Hdmonton Journal v. Alberta (Allorney General) was one of the 
Court's early initiatives in developing a model of governance to ensure 
that access to proceedings and publ ici ty would nOL he i nhihitcd hy 
c losure orders and publ ication bans." The three elements of the model 
can be found in most of the Court's open justice decisions. First and 
foremost arc the principle's underlying values. 111 Section 2(b)'s values 
arc recited in most of the jurisprndence; in the context of open justice, 
though, the values play more than a rhetorical role. Not only are they 
actively discussed and affirmed, they support a presumption in favour 
of openness that is not easily displaced. 
The second clement of the methodology, then, is a doctrinal frame-
work that is designed to protect those values oy defining and l imi ting 
the scope of derogations from the open courl principle. Chier Justice 
Larner created the templ<ile in Dagenais v. Canadian /Jroadcasling 
Corp.; I.hat Lcmplatc was then adapted and further entrenched in the 
j urisprudence in Camulian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Al -
torney General), as well <is in R. v. Men tuck and R. v. O.N.H. 11 The 
Dagenai.~!Me111uck standard which emerged sets sLructured cri teria 
which must he satisfied every time an exception is granted. 
A third aspect of this model grants the evidence a central role i n the 
decision making process. As a result, the Court has consistently stressed 
that exceptions wi ll not be permitted unless an cvidcntiary record estah-
9 ( 1989).1 198912 S.C.R. 1326, 1989 CarswellAlta 198. 1989 CarswellAlta 623, 
[ 19891 S.C.J. N u. 124. 119901 I W.W.R. 577, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 102 N.R. 
32 1, 71 Aha. L.R. (2u) 273, 103 A. R. 32 1, 41 C.P.C. (2d) 109, 45 C.R.R. I, 
19s9 sec 133 (S.c.c.). 
10 Sec, e.g., Ht/1110111011 .loumal, ibid. (perCo ry J.); Ca11adia11 JJroadcas1i111:1 Corp. 
v. New /Jmnnvick (A 11om ey General), [ 1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, 1996 CarswcllNB 
462. 1996 CarswellNB 463, l 1996] S.CJ. No. 38, 2 C.R. (5th) I , 110 C.C.C'. 
(3d) 193. 139 D.L.R.(4th) 385. 182 N.B.R.(2d)8 1, 463A.P.R 81 ,39C.R.R. 
(2d) 189. 203 N.R. 169. 2 B.H.R.C. 2 10 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Me11111ck. supra. 
note 7. 
11 Sec, e.g., Dagenais v. Canadian /Jroadcas1i11g Corp., supra note 7; Canadian 
/Jroadcas1i11g Corri. v. New /Jrun.nvick (Ariorney General), ibid.; Me11111ck, 
ibid. ; and R. v. 0 .N.IJ.)(200 I), !200 113S.C.R.478, 200 1 CarswellBC 2479, 
200 I Carswell BC 2480. 120011 S.C.J. No. 74, 200 I SCC 77, 158 C.C.C. (Jd) 
478, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 542, 47 C.R. (5th) 89, 279 N.R. 187. 97 B.C.L.H. (3d) 
I , 1200213 W.W.R. 205, 160 B.C.A.C. 16 1, 261 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.). 
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l ishe their j ustifiabi l i ty. It is axiomatic that l imits on Charter guarantees 
must be demonstrably justified under section 1. And though the purpose 
of the Oakes lest was, in part, to ensure that limits which are not sub-
stantiated would not be upheld, the Court has been inconsistent in its 
approach lo the evidence. The open court j urisprudence is dilTerenl, 
because there the Court has consistently demanded evidence to support 
derogations from that principle. 12 
Long before the arrival of constitutional rights, open court was a 
featured principle of the common law and its conception of the j ustice 
system's responsibility to the public. Macln1yre v. Nova Scolia ( Allomey 
General) was the decision that forged a link between a tradition of 
openness at common law and the constitutionalization of rights under 
the CharterY 
(h) Macintyre v. Nova Scotia (Attomey Gelleral) and the 
Covertness Exception 
Macintyre is the key, both to the constillltionalization of open cou1t 
under the Charter, and LO the status of that principle in invcstigatiw 
proceedings. By granting openness significant protection at common 
law, while recognizing the need for exceptions to protect competing 
interests, Macintyre showed the Court the way underthc Charrer. There, 
a journalist sought access to search warrants which had been issued on 
an ex parte basis in the course of a criminal investigation. Dickson J. 
held that though access lo such materials should he denied while an 
investigation is underway, the interest in maintaining covertness ends 
12 exceptions remain, as in Sierra Club of Cm10da v. Canada (Minister of Fi-
nance), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522. 2002 CarswcllNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823. 
[2002] S.C'.J. No. 42, 2002 SC'C 41. (suh nom. Atomic Energy of Cmwda Ltd. 
v. Sierra Club of Canada) 21 1 D.L. R. (4th) 193. (sub nom. Atomic Energy of 
Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 18 C.P.R. (4th) I, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 
16 1. 287 N.R. 203. 20 C.P.C. (5th) I. 40 Aclmin. L.R. (3d) I, (sub nom. Atomic 
Energy of Canada Lrd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, 223 
F.T.R. 137 (note) (S.C.C.) {upholding a conliclcntiality order in civil proceed-
ings); also, it is problematic that the lower courts have not granted the open 
cou11 p1inciple the same degree of respect as the Supreme Cou11 ; sec " An 
Excessive Use of Publication Bans", The G lobe & M ail, Scptcmbcr20, 2004, 
at Al2. 
13 1198211S.C.R.175, 1982CarswcllNS2 1, 1982CarswcllNS ll0,49 N.S.R. 
(2d) 609, 40 N.R. 181, 26C. R. (3d) 193, 96 A.P.R. 609, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 385, 
(sub nom. Nova Scotia (A11omey General) v. Macintyre) 65 C.C.C. (2d) 129 
(S.C.C.). 
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once the search warrant's work is over. AL lhat point, Lhe value in 
openness prevai ls over the need for an except ion during the active phase 
or investigation. 
Dickson J. 's opinion in Macintyre provided a template for the model 
of governance that evolved under the Charter. In doing so it incorporated 
the underly ing values of open court into lhc Courl's reasons, and then 
developed criteria to determine access to investigative materials. The 
j udge recognized I.hat limits are necessary at the investigati ve stage of 
the criminal process, bmh Lo proteeL Lhe innocent from premalllre pub-
licity and public suspicion, and to ensure that law enforcement objectives 
arc not pul at risk. Yet he also rejected the argument that covertness is 
a necessary incidenL of the investigation al all stages or the process. 
Having explai ned that " covertness is the exception and openness the 
rule,"1• and added that the rationale or the open court principle is "max-
imum accounLability and accessibility", 1 ~ he held that the principle or 
openness applies in j udicial proccc<lings, wha1ever their nature, and in 
the exercise of judicial powers. 16 And so he rejected a distinction be-
t.ween tria l and pretrial proceedings, because Parliament had seen fit " t.o 
involve the judiciary" in the issuance or search warrants. 17 Dickson J. 
concluded that all judicial proceedings must be held in public, whether 
they are part or a trial or not. 1X In the end, he proposed the following 
compromise between the open court principle and the need for secrecy: 
though members or the public should not have access to the appl ication 
or lo warrant materials while investigative steps arc being acti vely taken, 
once the investigation has concluded the materials arc subjecL to the 
open court princ iple and must be accessible to members of the public. '" 
In dissent, Martland J. stated thaL the function o f a j ustice may be 
considered to be a j udicial function, but " might more properly be de-
scribed as a fu nction performed by a judicial o fficcr".20 Investigation 
does not lead to a requ irement of openness, in his view, because it is not 
14 Ibid. , al 185. 
15 Ibid., al 184. 
I 6 Ibid. , at 185 (emphasis added). 
17 !hid. , at 186. 
18 !hid. (emphasis added). 
19 !hid. , al 189 (concluding that the administration of justice does jus1ify an i11 
camera proceedings when the warrant is issued, bul finding that once the 
warrant has heen executed, "exclusion thereafter of memhers of lhe public 
cannot normally hecountenanced"and lhatagcncral rule of acccss musl prevail 
except in respect of those who may he considered " innoccnl persons"). 
20 Ibid. , al 197. 
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mandalory lhal search warranlS be authorized in open comt, and the 
judge ne ither adjudicates nor makes any order. A l the same time, dis-
c losing search warrant information could damage a variety of interests , 
he thought, including the fa ir trial o f an accused, the safety of informants, 
law enforcement goals, and the reputation of innocent pe rsons uncon-
nected with the commission of an offence. Martland J. concluded tha t 
the search warrant process is not analogous to trial proceedings, and that 
opening search warrant documents to publ ic inspection " is not equiva-
lent to the right of the public to attend and witness proceedings in 
court".21 
On its face, section 83.28 is investigatory in nature.22 From thal 
perspective, Macintyre could support a conclusion that the open court 
pri nciple should be displaced in favour of in camera hearings during 
that phase of the investigation. At the same time, section 83.28 hearings 
are held in court under judicial supervis ion. In that regard, Macintyre 
could direct a contrary conclusion, that the proceedings must be open 
because the judic iary is involved. Vancouver Sun required the Supreme 
Court to choose between two interpretations of Macintyre. 
(c) Section 83.28 and the Judicialization of the Investigative 
Process 
T he joint majority opinion by Justices Iacobucci and Arbour began 
by noting the extraordinary and novel nature of the proceedings. As far 
as the Court was aware, the challenge Lo section 83.282~ and its Vancou-
ver Sun companion were the first cases to arise under the anti-te rror 
legislation.24 This provision empowers the Crown to compel a wi tness 
to allend a hearing and provide sworn evidence in aid of an investigation 
into terrorist activities. There a re two parts to the process: the Crown 
must apply, initially, for a judic ial order authorizing a hearing; and once 
that order is granted, the hearing which follows takes place in court 
before a judge.25 The question in Vancouver Sun was whether the open 
court princ iple applied to e ither or bmh parts of the section 83.28 process. 
2 1 /bid.,at 20 1. 
22 Supra, note 4. 
23 Supra, note 5. 
24 Supra, note I. 
25 Sees. 83.28(4) & (5), dealing with the making and contents o f an order to 
attend a hearing, and (8), making it mandatory for the investigatec to answer 
questions; supra, note 4. 
GOVERNANCE AND ANARCHY INS. 2(h) JURISPRUDENCE 79 
While the majority opinion in Vancouver Sun consistently referred 
LO it as a "judicial invcstigati ve hearing", Bastarache J.' s minority opin-
ion characLcr izcJ section 83.28 proceedings as an "investigati ve hear-
ing". As far as he was concerned, hearings under th<1 t provision are 
investigative in nature and Madntyre's reasons for recognizing a "cov-
ertness exception" should apply. Although the investigati ve hearings 
under section 83.28 arc a "new form of proceeding", Bastarache J. 
claimed that they raise "essentially the same issues" the Court had 
considered " in the context of other investigative tools''.2<' He observed 
that elsewhere, the Court had accepted the " necessity of clandest ine 
proceedings" and that "f s]ccrecy therefore has been recognized as par-
amount in other settings which apply equally to terrorist groups or 
organizations".27 Concerns arising from the disclosure of information, 
including the reputation of innocent individuals, witness safety, and the 
efficacy of investigat ive proceedings were in his view al least as strong, 
i f not stronger, under section 83.28 than in other investigative contexts 
such as search warrants and wiretaps. 2K 
Bastarache J. was lherefore unwill ing to assign seclion 83.28's in-
vestigative hear ing a judicial characler to which a presumption of open-
ness would apply. He noled thal the purpose or the hearing is to gather 
information and that the judge's role is limited. ln such circumslances, 
he found a requirement of openness counterproducti ve, because he 
claimed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to rebut the pre-
sumption and meet the evidentiary burden of the Oagenais/Mentuck test. 
As he explained, " l l]hc presumplion of openness cannot operate in 
ci rcumstances where it cannot in fact he rchutted".29 Because holding 
section 83.28 hearings in puhl ic wou ld threaten countervai l ing interests, 
he concluded that proceedings under chis rrov ision will "normally" be 
held in camera. ~0 Under his view, a requirement of openness would not 
he activated unti l the hearing is over, at which time ruhlic access could 
only be denied under the lenns of the Dasenai!>!Mentuck lest. 11 
M eanwhile, Justices A rbour and Iacobucci did not agree that a hear-
ing which is investigative in nature must he held in secret. ln their view, 
section 83.28's creation of a judicial investigati ve hearing triggered the 
26 Vancouver S1111, :;upra, note I, at parn. 73. 
27 Ibid. , al para. 75. 
28 lbid.,at parn!;. 73-76. 
29 lbid.,at pan1. 63. 
30 lbicl. ,at pam. 84. 
3 1 lbid.,at pan1. 83. 
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presumption or openness. In addition, the majority opinion rejected the 
view that the extraordinary selling of lhe anti -cerror legislat ion made a 
difference. Once Parliament chose to involve the judiciary, they said, 
hearings under section 83.28 must be as faithful l o the open court prin-
ciple "as is compatible with the task at hand".32 Iacobucci and Arbour 
JJ. stated that judges who arc granted a discretion under section 
83.28(5)(e) to determine the terms and conditions of hearings shou ld 
reject secrecy and apply a presumption of openness instead. 
Once having characterized the investigative hearing as judicial in 
nature, the open court principle became the majority's default posi tion. 
The j udges concluded chac covertness is an exception which can only be 
permitted at certain points in the process, and then only on evidence that 
demonstrates the need for that exception on an issue to issue and case 
to case basis. As the joint opinion explained, the presumption "should 
only be displaced upon proper consideration of the competing interests 
at every stage of the process".D As much as the subject matter of the 
cxis1cnce of a section 83.28 order should be made public as possible, 
they maintained, " unless, under the balancing exercise of the Dagenafa! 
Mentuck test, secrecy becomes necessary".:'< Once the existence or an 
order is made public, the judge should then determine, under the same 
test, whether "any information ought to be withheld from the public".35 
In applying the Dagenais/Mentuck approach to any decision to hold a 
hearing in camera, the majority opinion indicated that judges "should 
expect to be presented with evidence credible on its face of the risks that 
an open inquiry would present, including ev idence of the information 
expected to be revealed by a witness".16 
(d) Secrecy and the Air India Trial 
As the dissent pointed out, in vain, the Dagenais/Mentuck test re-
quires an evidentiary basis for limits on openness which perhaps cannot 
be establ ished in proceedings where the evidence is unknown at the time 
an exception is sought. Not only did Bastarache J. rely on an analogy to 
other investigative procedures to demonstrate why such a high standard 
of proof is inappropriate, his opinion considered the risks inherent in 
32 lbid. ,at. para. 38. 
33 lbid. ,al para. 39 (emphasis in original). 
34 /bid.,(ernph<isis adde::d) 
35 lbid. ,al para. 40. 
36 lbid.,al para. 43. 
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opening up invcsligative hearings.~7 A hhough lhc majori ty opinion 
agreed thal " li l t may very well be lhal by necessily large parls of judicial 
invest igati ve hearings will be held in secrcl" , lhc Courl 's fcally to the 
open court principle and lhe evidentiary requirements which must be 
met lo displace i t did not waver. ~~ 
The slate's powers under section 83.28 are extraordinary, and those 
powers were pul Lo unusual use in case.The Crown began section 83.28 
proceedings to see whe1her it could holster iLs evidence in the Air India 
trial, which was al the time underway in a different courtroom under the 
supervision or another judge.'9 The ex parle order authorizing an inves-
tigati ve hearing required the Named Person, who was not charged with 
any offence, to atlcnd in <.:ourL and give sworn information relating Lo 
the A ir India crash and the Crow n's theory that il was caused hy a 
terrorist bomb. The j udge ordered that the hearing he in camera and 
prohibited the Named Person from disclosing any i nformation pertaining 
to the hearing. The Named Person challenged the consti tutionali ty of 
section 83.28, and Lhal hearing was also held in camera. The judge who 
heard the application dismissed the investigatee' s cons1i1Utional chal -
lenge. 
Nei1her the press nor the publ ic had notice of proceedings wh ich 
were conducled entirely in secret The two accused in the ongoing Air 
I ndia trial knew nothing of the proceedings either, but " fortuitously" 
became aware of the order. By happenstance, an alen Vancouver Sun 
reporter also discovered thal a hearing which was somehow l inked Lo 
Air India was Lak ing place behind closed doors. A s a result of those 
developments, the judge who dismissed the constitutional challenge 
deli vered a synopsis of her reasons in open court. She allowed counsel 
for the Air India co-accused LO attend Lhe invesLigative hearing, but 
prohibited the lawyers from d isclosing any in formation learned in that 
hearing lo Lheir cl ients. 
If it is accepted that the o pe n court princ iple nrns t sometimes y id<l, 
the secrecy of lhis process was troubling. The f act that proceedings were 
commenced was unknown, not only to the publ ic bul also to Lhc accused 
stantl ing trial, who had an interesL in what that process disclosed. T hal 
a consti lulional challenge to section 83.28 had been brought was also 
37 See paras. 68-7 1 (discussing the safety, interests and rights of wi tnesses and 
third parties), and paras. 72-82 (considering the ri sk lo the proper administra-
tion of j ustice). 
38 lbid.,at para. 41. 
39 T he facts are set out in paras. 5-20 in the joint majo ri ty opinion; ibid. 
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hidden from Lhe public. But for lhc doggedness of one reporter, the 
hearing and ils consequences for the Air India trial might have remained 
a dark secrel in the criminal justice process. 
It is apparent that at. least some members of the Court were taken 
aback by this chain of events. In the constitut ional challenge to section 
83.28, two of seven members of the panel were prepared to declare the 
provision unconstitutional and a third, Binnie J. , expressed his outrage 
over what he regarded as a serious abuse of process. 40 In Vancouver Sun, 
Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. refrained fro m critic izing the lower court 
judges but made it pla in that " the present fac ts clearly illustrate the 
mischief Lhat flows from a presumption of secrecy".41 The problem was 
that " ls]ecrecy Lhen becomes Lhe norm, is applied across the board, and 
seal ing orders fo llow as a mauer of course".42 As they explained, the 
"unfolding of events" in Vancouver Sun and the seclion 83.28 case also 
illustrates "how antithetical to judicial process secret hearings are".4 .l 
If Lhe inv~tigative nature of the process counselled against the full 
rigour of the ope n court principle, the extenuating circumstances of this 
hearing and the public distrust the process could so easily breed may 
have been factors in the Court 's decision to place section 83.28 under 
its strictures. By requiring the government to satisfy the Dagenais/ 
Men1uck test or else hold section 83 .28 hearings in public, the Court 
placed a substamial burden on the provision's use. W ilhout striking it 
down, the Court made it more di fficult for the government to conduct 
investigative hearings into tem>rist activities. The question that divided 
the majority and minority opinions was whether the Maclnt.yre rationales 
permitted a presumption of covertness in the case of section 83 .28's 
investigative hearing, or whether the competing interests at stake rnuld 
be adequately protected under a presumption of openness, with covert-
ness as the fallback position, under the Dagenais/Mentuck lest. To the 
extent the government cannot effecti vely conduct investigative hearings 
under a presumption of openness, Vancouver Sun may have effectively 
rendered it unavailable. 
40 LeBe l and Fish dissented and wo uld have declared s .83.28 invalid; Binnie J. 
would have upheld the provision but found its use in these circumstances to 
be a n abuse of process. As he stated, " the s.83.28 order in this case was sought 
by the Cro wn for an inappropriate purpose, it was g ranted on inappropriate 
terms, and its i mpropricty was no t cured"; supra, note 5,at para. I I I. 
41 Vancouver Sun, supra, note I, al para.SO. 
42 Ibid. 
43 lbid. ,al para. 52. 
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What emerges from Vancouver Sun is a commitment lo open ju:stice 
and lo lhe standards of governance that arc necessary lo protect that 
principle. IL may he that the circumstance::; :surrounding Lhc Air India 
section 83.28 application made i t easy for the Court to impose a const i-
tutional requirement o f transparency. Yet the government claimed Lhal 
covertness was required and the Courl' s rejection of the claim revealed 
its commilment to open justice and to section 2(b). That is why Vancou-
ver Sun stands as an example of principled decision making. 
3. HARPER V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
(a) The Contextual Approach: Not a section 2(b) Success Story 
Though the Supreme Court did not apply the contextual approach 
in terms, Harper v. Canada (Auorney Gen.emf) is of thal tradit ion in the 
section 2(b) jurisprudence.44 That approach, which dominated decision 
making in Lhe 1990s, was based on the following contradiction. On one 
hand, according to Irwin Toy l td. c. Quebec ( Procureur general), free-
dom or expression is based on a principle of content neutrality.4~ ln other 
words, all expressive activity - whether offensive or not and whether 
valuable or not - is protected by section 2(b) of the Charter. On the 
other hand, the content of expression can and should be treated differ-
ently under section 1.4'' 
The suggestion that not all expressive acti vi ties are equal first found 
voice in the proposal to apply a contextual approach in balancing values 
under section I .47 Before long that innovation added a step to the Oakes 
test which allowed the judges to assess the relati ve value of expression. 48 
44 Supra, note 2. 
45 (sub nom. Irwin Toy Ltd. 11. Quebec (Attomey General)) I I 989J I R.C.S. 927, 
1989 CarswelJQuc I ISF, 1989 CarsweJJQuc 115, 94 N.R. 167, 58 D.L.R. (4e) 
577, 24 Q.A.C. 2, 25 C.P.R. (3e) 4 17, 39 C.R.R. 193 (S.C.C.). 
46 See l?ocket v. Royal College of De111a/ Surgeons (Ontario) , 119901 2 S.C.R. 
232, 1990 CarswellOnt IO 14, 1990 Ca1s wellOn1 10 I 4F, (sub nom. Royal 
College of Dental Surgeons (Ontario) v. Rocket) 11 1 N.R. 161 , 7 1 D.L.R. (4lh) 
68, 47 C.R.R. 193, (sub nom. Royal College of Dental Surgeons (Onwrio) v. 
t<ocket) 40 0.A.C. 24 1, 73 O.R. (2d) 128 (note) (S.C.C.) (stating that not all 
infringements of section 2(b) are equally serious and that some are easier to 
justi fy than othe rs). 
47 Edmonton Jottmaf, supra, note 10. 
48 See R. v. Keegsrra ( 1990), [ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 1990 Carswt:l lAILa 192, 1990 
CarswcllAlta 66 1, I C.R. (4th) 129, 77 Alla. L.R. (2d) 193, 117 N.R . 1, [ 1991 J 
2 W.W.R. I, 114 A.R. 81, 6 1 C.C.C. (3d) I, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.C.). 
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"Core values" analysis was a device lhat enabled the Court to attenuate 
the standard of justification when it deemed the content of a message lo 
be of low value. In function and result, the contextual approach's values 
analysis legitimized the kinds of content distinctions s. 2(b )' s neutrality 
principle was designed to avoid. 
In turn this methodology produced a generation of decisions which 
upheld a variety of restric tions on " low value" expression.49 In effect, 
the core-values analysis saved limits on expressive activ ity whenever 
49 A lis1 o f cases that re lied on 1he low value of the message to uphold limits 
under section I includes R. v. Keegstra, Ibid. ; Canada (Human Rights Co111-
111ission) v. Taylor, r 19901 3 S.C.R. 892, 1990 Carswell Nat 742, 1990 
Carswel lNat 1030, [19901 S.C.J. No. 129, 75 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 
116, (sub nom. Taylor v. Canada (Hwmm Righ.1s Commission)) 11 7 N .R. 191, 
13 C.H.R.R. D/435 (S.C.C.); R. v. Butler, Ll 992] I S.C.R. 452, 1992 
CarswellMan 100, 1992 CarswellMan 220, [1992) 2 W.W.R. 577, 11 C.R. 
(4th) 137, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 129, 134 N.R. 8 1, 8 C.R.R. (2d) I , 89 D.L.R. (4th) 
449, 78 Man. R. (2d) I, 16 W ./\.C. I (S.C.C.), reconsidera1 ion re fused [ 1993] 
2 W.W .R. lxi (S.C.C.); Allis v. New Brunswick District No. 15 Board of 
J::ducation. (sub nom. Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15) [ I 996J 
I S.C.R . 825, 1996 CarswellNB 125, 1996 CarswellNB 125F, [1996) S.C.J. 
No. 40, (sub nom. Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15) 133 D.L.R. 
(4th) I , 195 N.R. 8 1, 37 Admin. L.R. (2d) 13 1, (sub 110111. Ross v. New Bruns-
wick School District No. 15) 25 C.H.R.R. DI 175, (sub no m. Au is v. Board of 
School Trustees, District No. 15) 35 C.R.R. (2d) I, 437 A.P.R. 321, (suh nom. 
Anis v. Board of School Trustees, District No. 15) 96 C.L.L.C. 230-020, 17 1 
N.B.R. (2d) 321 (S.C.C.); imd R. v. Lucas ( 1998), [ 1998] I S.C.R. 439, 1998 
CarswellSask 93, 1998 CarswellSask 94, 224 N.R. 16 1, 123 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 
157D.L.R.(4th) 423.50C.R.R.(2d)69. 163Sask.R.16 1, 165W.A.C.1 6 1. 
14 C.R. (5th) 237, f 1999'14 W.W .R. 589, 5 B.H.R.C. 409 (S.C.C.); see also R. 
v. Zundel, [ 19921 2 S.C.R. 73 1, 1992CarswellOnt 109, 1992Carswell0nt 995, 
16 C.R. (4th) I , 75 C.C.C. (3d)449, 10 C.R.R. (2d) 193, (sub nom. R. v. Zundel 
(No. 2)) 56 0.A.C. 161 , (sub nom. R. v. Zundel (No. 2)) 140 N.R . I, 95 D.L. R. 
(4th) 202 (S.C.C.); !UR-Macdonald Inc. c. Canada (Procureur general) , (sub 
nom. RJR-MacD011ald Inc. v. Canada (Auomey General)) (1995] 3 R.C.S. 
199, 1995 CarswellQue I 19, 1995 CarswellQue I 19F, [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, 
(sub nom. R.IR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Auorney General)) 127 D.L.R. 
(4c) I, (sub 110111. RJR-MacD011ald fnc. v. Canadtz (A11orney General)) 100 
C.C.C. (3e) 449, (sub nom. R.IR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Allorney Gen-
eral)) 62C.P. R. (3e) 417, (sub nom. IUR-MacD011ald Inc. v. Canada (A11oruey 
General)) 3 1 C.RR. (2e) 189, (sub nom. R.IR-MacDonald Inc. c. Canada 
(Procureur general)) 187 N.R. l (C.S.C.); and R. v. Slwrpe, 1200 1) I S.C.R . 
45, 2001CarswellBC82, 200 I CarswellBC83, [200 1] S.C.J. No. 3, 2001 SCC 
2 , 194 D.L.R. (4th) I, 150 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 39 C.R . (5th) 72, 264 N.R. 20 1, 
146B.C.A.C.16 1, 239W.A.C. 16 1,88B.C.L. R.(3d) 1,[20011 6 W.W.R. I, 
86 C .R.R. (2d) I (S.C.C .) (dissenting opinions). 
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the Courl found that Lhe content or the message had lilllc or no value. 
One difficulty was !hat this approach conflated the concepts of value 
and harm: it assumed that expression which has l iule or no value is also 
harmful, whether or nol a harm independent of its perceived value could 
be shown. Al the same time, an approach thal limited expressive activity 
which was valueless but not harmful rendered the principle of content 
neutrality a ll but meaningless. As long as that methodology preva iled, 
the prospects for section 2(b) and the principle of content nculralily 
remained dim. 511 Moreover, the contextual approach could not be con-
sidered a model of governance, because i l invoked an abslracl and ideal 
conception or expression to undermine the freedom in particular cases, 
il addcJ '\:ontexl" Lo the Oakes test as a way or di luting the standard of 
j ustificat ion under section I , and it allowed the Court to uphold Ii mi ts 
on expression that was perceived as valueless but not proven, by evi-
dence, to be harmful. 
More rccenlly, !he Court has downplayed !he role of the contextual 
approach in section 2(b).51 If it is unforlunale that the Court has not 
invalidaled a legislaLive restriction on expressive freedom since Thom-
son Newspapers Co. V. Canada (Allorney Geneml), !he decline or !he 
contextual approach has heen encouraging . ~2 Its drop in doctrinal stallls 
suggested thal the Court had begun to separate the concepts or value 
and harm in determining the permissibility of contcn!-based distinctions. 
This was a welcome dcvelopmenl, because expression is not constitu-
tionally protected because a given message is necessarily valuable, hut 
rather because freedom prevails unless there is evidence that its content 
is harmful. Placing the focus under section I on the evidence or harm is 
more consistent with the principle o f content neutrality and the under-
lying values of section 2(b). 
In hindsight, the contextual approach had two redeeming 4ual i ties. 
Firsl, though misdirected, the Court was forthright enough during the 
1990s lo explu in l hnl the consl.ilulionul status o f expressio n <lcpen<led 
on the value of the message. This the majority opinion in Harper did 
nol or could not do. Second, the contextual approach did not deter the 
50 For a critique of the contextual approach, see J. Cameron, "The Past, Present 
and 1-'ulure of Expressive Freedom Under the Charter", ( 1997), 35 0.H.L.J. I. 
5 1 Lucas, supra, note 49 may have Ileen the last time a 1rnijority opinion was 
explicitly based on this analysis. 
52 Ll9981 I S.C.R. 877, Ll998l S.C.J. No. 44, 1998 CcirswellOnt 198 1, 1998 
CarswellOnt 1982, 159 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 226 N.R. I, 5 I C.R. R. (2cl) I 89, 38 
O.R. (3d) 735 (headnote only), 109 0.A.C. 201, 5 B.11.R.C. 567 (S.C.C.). 
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Court from prolecling unpo pular or controversial expressive aclivity 
when seelion I' s requirements were nol met. For instance, despite a 
rising tide against smoking, tobacco companies and advertising, a ma-
j ority he ld in RJR-Macdonald Inc. that Parliament's ban on tobacco 
advertising unjustifiably violated freedom of cxprcssion.5~ Another ex-
ample is Libman c. Quebec (Procureur general), which invalidated 
limits on thi rd party spending under the minimal impairment analysis, 
despite the Court's conclusion tha t such limits are justifiable in princi-
plc.54 A third is T homson Newspapers, which applied a principled sec-
tion I analysis and is an example of governance for that reason.55 The 
contextual approach may be in remission al present, but that does not 
mean that the Court's decisions are grounded in princ iple. 
Only days before Prime Minister Martin called a federa l e lection in 
May 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada issued one of its mosl important 
j udgments on expressive freedom in Harper v. Canad.c1 (Attorney Gen-
erul).5" There, the Coufl upheld the Canada Election Act's limits on 
third party advertising during federal eleccion campaigns:57 Parliament's 
restrictions ta rgeted the status of the speaker, as a third party or citizen 
participant, rather than the content of the expression. Nor did the Coun 
rely on the contextua l approach to uphold the reslrictions; participation 
in a democratic e lection is at the core of section 2(b) and it wou ld have 
been awkward lo dilute section I on a "core- values" analysis. Instead, 
when it found them inconvenient, t.he majority opinion simply defl ected 
section I's evidentiary requirements. As Harper shows, the result of an 
ad hoc approach to section I and its evidentiary requirements is meth-
odological anarchy . The point is reinforced by the Court's pre-Harper 
decis ions on panic ipalion in the democratic process .~ij 
53 StqJra , note 49. 
54 [ 1997) 3 R.C.S. 569, 1997 CarswellQue 85 1, 1997 CarswcllQue 852, [1997.1 
S.C.J. No. 85, (sub nom. Libman v. Quebec (A//om ey General)) 151 D.L.R. 
(4e) 385, (sub nom. Libman v. Quebec (A1tom ey General)) 46 C.R.R. (2e) 
234. 3 B.H.R.C. 269 (S.C.C.). 
55 Supra, note 52. 
56 Supra, note 2. McLachlin C.J. and Major J. wrote a joint dissent, in which 
Binnie J. concurred. 
57 Suvra, note 3. 
58 Compare Hw1>er v. Canada with Thomson Newspapers, ibid., and Figueroa 
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] I S.C. R. 91 2, 12003 i S.C.J. No. 37, 
2003 CarswellOnt 2462, 2003 CarswellOnt 2463, 176 0.A.C. 89, 108 C.R.R. 
(2d) 66, 2003 sec 37, 227 D.L.R. (4th) I, 306 N.R. 70 (S.C.C.). 
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(b) Elections and the Contest Between Equality and Participation 
Restrictions on third party advertising were l itigated under earlier 
statutory provisions, and though the legislation was ded ared invalid on 
two occasions prior to Harper v. Canada (Allorney General), neither 
case reached the Supreme CourL of Canada.59 ln Lhc fall of 2000, Harper 
l stayed an inj unction against application of the Canada Hlection Act's 
spending limits .<~) W ith M ajor J. dissenting, the Courl concluded that the 
tialance favoured enforci ng legislation which might tic round unconsti-
tutional over staying i ts enforcement Lo protect the exerc ise or section 
2(ti) rights during an election campaign. Harper returned to the Court 
for decision on the merits afler the Alberta Court of Appeal invalidated 
the challenged provisions.<•1 
Though the constitutional ity of limits under.federal legislation was 
a matter of first impression for the Coun in Harper 11, the status o f third 
party advertising was not. I n 1997 Libman c. Quebec ( Procureur xe-
neral) held that provincial legislation which effectively banned th ird 
59 Sec National Ci1ize11s' Coali1io11 lnc./Coali1io11 11atio11ale des citoye11s Inc. v. 
Callada (Auom ey General), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 481, 1984 CarswellAlta 87, 32 
Alta. L.R . (2d) 249, L 19841SW.W.R. 436, 14 C.R.R.6 1 (Alta. Q.B.) (declaring 
a prohihirion on third party spending unconstitutional), and Canada (A11orney 
Ge11eral) v. Somerville. 136 D.L.R. (4th) 205. 1996 Carswell Alta 503. 39 A lta. 
L.R. (3d) 326, 37 C.R.R. (2d) 24, 1'199618 W.W.R. 199. 184 A.R. 241, 122 
W.A.C. 24 1 (Alta. C.A.) ( invalidating legislative restrictions on third party 
spending). 
60 Harper v. Ca11ada (Artom ey Ge11eral) (2000), [2000) 2 S.C.R. 764, 2000 
CarswellAlta 11 58, 2000 CarswellA lta 1159, [2000J S.C.J. No. 58, 2000 SCC 
57, 193 D.L.R. (4th) 38, 27 1 A .R . 201 , 234 W.A.C. 201 , L200 11 9 W.W.R. 
20 I, 92 Alta. L.R. (3d) I (S.C.C.). 
6 1 266 AR. 262, 2000 CarswellAlta 1198, [2000] A .J. No. 1240, 2000 ABCA 
288, 228 W.A.C. 262 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed (2000). 2000 
CurswcllAltn 1287. 2000 CarswellAlta 1288. 262 N.R. 201 (S.C.C.). The 
majority opinion round " no persuasive evidence" that the problems which are 
associated with campaign tinancing in American politics have arisen in Can-
ada; ibid. , at para 115. The Court also complai ncd that, instead of presenting 
fresh evidence, the government was content to recycle out of date information 
from the Lo1tie Report. Consequently, a majority concluded that the govern-
ment had foiled to establish the potential harm, and held that controll ing third 
pa11y spending was not even a pressing and substantial concern under the first 
past o f Oakes. Ibid., at para. 134. In addition, the appellate court found that the 
legislation failed the proportionality test because the scheme's $3000 l imit 
rendered even mi11i111ally effective third pany adverti si ng " nugatory"; in its 
view a provision that "so restricts freedom of expression to make i t ineffectual 
is equivalent to an absolute ban". Ibid. , at para. 176. 
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party participation in a referendum setting was unconsti lutionaJ.<'2 De-
spite that resull, the Court's unanimous opinion rel ied heavily on the 
Lortie Commission Report,6~ expressly disagreed with the Alberta Court 
of Appeal 's decision in Canada (Allorney General) v. Somerville,M and 
recognized that "spending limits arc essential to ensure the primacy of 
the principle of fairness in democratic elections".<'~ Not only did Libman 
find such limits permissible, it indicated that they are posi ti vely desirable 
as well. 
The Lortie Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing 
was charged Lo look at a number of issues relating 10 the electoral system 
and campaign finances, including the role of third party advertising, was 
one such issue. On that question the Commission was strongly of the 
v iew that limits on participation are vi tal to the integrity and fairness of 
the electoral process. In part, that v iew rested on the conclusion that it 
would be impossible to control party spending i f third party advertising 
was nOl regu lated. Significantly, though, the Commission also treated 
third parties as outsiders who should be held to a nominal role in election 
campaigns. The Commission thought that their participation would ti lt 
the play ing field, skew the process <inc.I pose a disrnplivc prcsc111;c in 
elecLion debate.66 Inevitably, some voices would become too powerful 
and others would be drowned out 
Libman c. Quebec (Procureur general) agreed wi th those conclu-
sions. Specifically, the Court found that Quebec's restrictions on refer-
endum adve1tising were " highly laudable": the Ii mi rs would prevenl "the 
most affluent members of soc iety from exerting a disproportionate in-
fluence by dominating the referendum debate through access to greater 
resources"; t:he limits would ensure that some positions are not "buried 
by others"and permit an " informed choice" by voters; moreover, by 
preventing the process from being "dominated by the power of money" , 
62 Supra, note 56. Sec C. Fcasby, "Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) And the Adminis-
tration o f the Process of Democracy under the Charter: The Emerging Egali-
tarian M odel" ( 1999), 44 M cGill LJ. 5. 
63 Sec Royal Co111111issio11 011 Electoral Reform and Party Financing ( the "L ortie 
Repo1t") (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 199 1) . 
64 Supra, note 59. 
65 Lih111a11 , supra, note 56, al 598 (citing the Lortie Commission). 
66 Ir would he disruptive in two ways: first it wou ld undercutthe political equality 
of citizens because those with wealth could monnpolize the discourse and 
attain greater influence than those less aflluent; and second, third parly partic-
ipation would create advantages and disadvantages for the candidates and their 
parties that would affect the fairness of' e lections. 
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limits would " preserve the con fidence of the electorate in the electoral 
process".67 
At lhe same time, 's support for spending limi ls con llictcd with the 
Alberta Court of Appeal's decision in Canada (Allorney General) v. 
Somerville, which had invalidated Parliament' s earlier restrictions on 
third party advcrtising.<.i< The federal government d id not seek leave lo 
appeal and Somerville never came before the Court. T hough it had no 
access LO the record and evidence, or lO submissions from counsel , the 
Court's unanimous opinion simply declared in Libman that ' 'we cannot 
accept the A lberta Court of Appeal' s point of view because we disagree 
with its conclusion" .69 
The Court inval idated Quebec's referendum spending limits i n any 
case because the restrictions effect ively placed a toLal ban on third party 
participation .70 In strik ing the legislation, it suggested that a limit simi lar 
to that recommended hy the Lortie Commission would he "far less 
intrusive" of expressive frecdom.7 1 W i thout endorsing the Commis-
sion 's recommendation, which proposed a $ 1,()()() maximum, the Court 
indicated that the amount allowed would " have Lo he fair whi le being 
small enough to be consistent with the objecti ves of the Act".72 
The federal government responded w ith new provisions that reseL 
the th ird party limit on spending in parliamentary elections al $30(X) per 
const ituency and $ 150,000 nationally. Jn light of Libman the question 
in Harper II was whether that l imit was generous enough to survive 
review under section I . The Alberta Court or Appeal once again an-
swered that question in the negative.n Meanwhile, the Supreme Court 's 
jurisprudence had evolved. 
After supporting its position on third party l imi ts in Libnum, a 
majority of the Court in Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney 
General) disagreed with the Lortie Commission and struck Parliament's 
ban on opinion polls in the final 72 hours of an election campaign.7~ A s 
67 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
68 Supra, note 59 
69 Libman, supra, note 56, at 61 9. 
70 Under the Special Version uf the Elec:tiun Act applicable lo the referendum 
process, third party spending was l imited, under S<x;tio11 404, lo u maximum 
of $600, w hich could be applied to the organization or ho lding of a meeting. 
71 Supra, note 56, at 6 19-20. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Supra, note 6 1. 
74 T hough Lhe Lortie Commission recommended a 48 hour blackout, the legis-
lative p1·ovisio n considered by lhc Court in Tlro111so11 Newspapers established 
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with chird party spending limits, the a rgument for a blackout was thac 
such polls might undul y influence voters and distort election results. 
Agai nst a strong dissent by Gonthier J., Bastarache J. re lied on sound 
methodology to ex plain his reasons for striking the limit.75 
After carefully considering the evidence, he held that "lt]he very 
serious invasion of the freedom o f ex pression of all Canadians is not 
outweighed by the speculative and marginal benefits postulated by the 
government".76 In doing so he refused to accept that voters require<l 
Parliament's inte rvention to protect them from information which might 
corrupt their ballot decision. To the contrary, he asserted that voters 
have " the right ro consider the resulls of polls as pan of a strategic 
exercise of their vote".17 Bastarache J. a lso scoffed at the suggestion that 
in doing so ci tizens would be "so naive as to forget the issues and interests 
which motivate them to vote for a particular candidate".'~ He claimed 
that it was impossible, "without gravely insulting the Canadian voter", 
to accept that " there is any likelihood that an individual would he so 
enthralled by a particular poll result as to allow his or her e lectoral 
judgment to be ruled by it".79 
His majority opinion also considered the relative value and harm of 
opinion polls in some detail. On that point Bastarache J. stated that " lt]hc 
possibility of harm aris ing from the unfortuicous publication of an in-
accurate poll does not replace the general na1ure of this expression at 
the core of s.2(b)".x0 Despite the possibility that some voters might be 
mis led by these polls, he rejected the suggestion that the harm warranted 
a "significant level of deference lo the government in fashioning means 
which trespass on the freedom of expression".x1 As he explai ned, "little 
75 
a 72 hour backoul; supra, note 2 1. 
In dissent, Gonthier J. maintained that " lbleing themselves the very objects of 
elect.ions, members of Parliarncnl were in lhe best posi1ion to assess the effects 
o f polls in electoral campaigns and their impact on indi vidual voters"; ibid .• at 
908. Following a review of the evidence he concluded that opinion polls have 
a significant influence and are subject to "error, misrepresentation and tare] 
open to manipulation" ibid., al 925. In such circumstances it. was justifiable 
for Parliament to draw a distinction between voter access to any and all infor-
mation, including poor information, and voter access to good information, 
including timely information. Ibid., at 908 amt 923. 
76 Ibid., al 973. 





Ibid., at 945 (emphasis added). 
Ibid. , al 962. 
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dcfcrcm:c shoullJ be shown in Lhis case where the contextual facLOrs 
indicate that the government has not established thal the harm which i t 
is seeking LO prevent is widespread or significanl".x2 
Bastarache J. found no ev idence that voters suffered from any mis-
apprehension regarding the accuracy of a single poll.83 To that he added 
that the government's claims of w idespread or significant harm were 
not compelling. fn fact he responded harshly lO the govcrnmcm's aucmpl 
to justify the ban "on the basis I hat some indeterminate number o f voters 
might be unable Lo spot an inaccurate poll result and might rely Lo a 
significant degree on the error ... "M. Jn striking down the opinion poll 
blackout, Bastarache J. gave section 2(b )' s underly ing values and section 
I 's cvidcntiary requirements r igourous and disciplined attention. Nota-
bly, Thomson Newspapers was the fi rs t Supreme Court decision under 
section 2(h) to break ranks wi th the di lution of section I analysis under 
the contextual approach during this period. It provided a model of gov-
ernance of section 2(b) adjudication outside the open j ustice context 
In addit ion lO Thomson Newspapers and its ev idence-based section 
2(b) methodology, the Supreme Court establ ished a right to participate 
in the democratic process in Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General).85 
I n doing so, Figueroa created potential conllict between the principle 
of meaningful partic ipation and Libman's support for third party spend-
ing limits. There, the challenge was aimed at provisions in the Canada 
Elections Act which made the statutory benefits and enti tlements that 
are available to political parties subject to a 50 candidate minimum. 
Though it did not interfere with any cil i'l-en's right lo vole, the minimum 
disadvantaged smaller parties that could not field that many <.:andidates. 
Parties unable Lo <.:ross that threshold cou ld not be registered, were not 
eligible to issue iax receipcs, LO transfer unused election funds LO the 
party, or to have their party affiliation listed on the ballot. ~" 
Section 3 of the Charter protects the rights o f ci tizens, not of can-
di<latcs for offi<:c and thei r politi<:al pa rt ics.x? In the <:i rcumslanccs, the 
Court could only find a breach of the guarantee by conclud ing that 
Pad iamcnt' s requirements for party status infringed Lhe individual rights 
82 Ibid. , a l 963 (emphasis added). 
83 Ibid., at 956. 
84 Ibid. , a l 97 I (emphasis added). 
85 Supru, note 58. 
86 Canada Elec1io11s Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.E-2, ss.24(2), 24(3), and 28(2). 
87 This guaramee provides: "Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote.: in an 
election or rneml)ers or the House uf Commons or or a legislative assembly 
and lO ht: qualilicd for 1r1cn1ht:rship the rein" . 
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of Canadian voters. In the course or invalidating provisions that excluded 
the Communisl Party from statulory benefits, Iacobucci J. created an 
individual right to play a meaningful role in the democratic process. 
H is majority opinion began from the proposition that section 3 
guarantees the righl "Lo a certain level of pai1icipation in the electoral 
process".xx Iacobucci J. expanded on the concept of participation by 
describing i t as the right " lo express an opinion about the formation of 
social pol icy and the functioning of publit: inslilutions through partici -
pation in the electoral proccss"."9 He added that i f the sovereign power 
in a democracy resides in "the people as a whole", each citizen "musl 
have a genuine opportunity to take part in the governance of the country 
through participation in Lhe selection of elected representativcs".9(1"Ab-
scnl such a right", he concluded, "ours wou Id not be a true democracy" .~» 
For those reasons, participation under his conception of democracy has 
an intrinsic value independent <~{its impact upon the actual outcome of 
elections". 92 
Figueroa found Lhat the 50 candidalc minimum disadvantaged the 
Communisl Party in ways that would deny ciLizens access lo that Party's 
ideas. As such, Lhc legislalion infringed the righL of voLers to "play a 
meaningfu l role in the electoral process".''~ Specifically, Parliament's 
exclusionary threshold compromised voter parlicipation because pro-
v isions that disadvantaged smaller panics augmente<lexisting disparities 
and enabled the " most affluent parties" to dominate the public discourse, 
thereby depriving their opponenls of a reasonable opportun ity to speak 
and to be heardY4 In other words, the 50 candidate minimum exacerbated 
a pre-existing disparity in the capacity of d isadvantaged political parties 
to imroducc their ideas to the open dialogue of the electoral process. 
The problem wi th Parliament' s scheme was that it enabled the estab-
lished parties to retain their advantages of size and opportunity. The 
voices of smaller parties would be drowned out under such a scheme.95 
88 Figueroa, supra, 110Le 58, al 934. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., al 936 (emphasis added). 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., al 935 (emphasis added). 
93 Ibid., at 933. 
94 Ibid .. at 945. 
95 A s Iacobucci J. explained: ''the already marginalized voices o f political parties 
with a limited geographical base will be drowncd oul by Lhc mainstream parties . 
. . . "; ibid. 
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Figueroa held signillcance for Harper II because spending limits 
have a greater, and more immediate impact on participation in the dem-
ocratic process. The reason is LhaL restrictions on third party participation 
effectively grant the political parties and their candidates a monopoly 
on debate during an election campaign. Provisions which limit third 
patties to nominal spending unavoidably exacerbate the ex isting dispar-
i ties between party and non-party participants. Moreover, the acknowl-
edged purpose of such limi1s is that 10 limit the role of third parties in 
the electoral process. 
Seemingly, Harper v. Canada (A11orneyGenera/) required the Court 
to choose between Ubman's egali tarian model and Figueroa 's principle 
of meaningful participation. Under the Libman-Lonie view, elections 
arc a process in which candidates and their parties arc the acti ve part ic-
ipants. T hat conception allows voters and third part ies to exerc ise nom-
inal rights or pa1ticipation but otherwise relegates them lo status as 
passive observers. The only forms of participation open to them are the 
right to vote, which is guaranteed by section 3 or the Charter, and the 
right to exercise their section 2(b) rights by making donat ions to the 
candidates or their polit ical part ies. Beyond the small allowance per-
mitted in recent years by stalute, individuals and groups are not allowed 
to participate in their own voice. 
The dilemma for the Court was that Figueroa's principle of mean-
ingful participation could not be easi ly reconciled with Ubman's egal-
itarian rationale. Under the Libman-Lortie concept of electoral fairness, 
all third parties arc formally equal: the process treats them the same way 
by effectively excluding them individually and as a collective of c itizen-
partic ipanls from playing a role in election <lebate. That concept ion of 
fairness focuses almost exclusive attention on the interests of political 
parties and their candidates. Libman made it clear in the statement that 
third party participation should be limited because " Ii Independent 
spending coulJ very wel l have the effect of directly or indirectly pro-
moting one candidate or political party to the detriment of the others".96 
Despite acknowledging that thi rd parties contribute to the debate in 
valuable ways, the Court concluded that their participation can be limited 
because "it is the candidates and political parties that are running for 
e/ection".91 Third parties may be equal Lo each other in the system but 
equal, under that conception of participation, means discntitlcd. 
96 Supra, rlOlC 56 <\ l 600. 
97 Ibid. , at 60 I (emphasis added). 
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(c) The Egalitarian Model and the Equal Right Not to Participate 
T hough Bastarache J. acknowledged that Harper JI provided the 
first opportunity for the Court to consider third party spending limits, 
his interpretation of Libman c. Quebec ( Procureur general) made it 
impossible for the challenge to succeed.9x He deflecced Thomson News-
papers and Figueroa by circu lar rea">oning which rested on the following 
logic. First he noted that Libman's concept of electoral fairness was 
consistent with the egalitarian model adopted by Parliament.w Then he 
observed that the C.£.A. 's third party limits constituted a response to 
Libman. The resul t was insti tutional accord: Libman's endorsement of 
limits was consistent with the government' s conception of electoral 
fairness, and the government's response to Libman was consistent wi th 
the Court's conception of electoral fairness. Once Bastarache J. round 
that Parliament and the Court agreed on the merits of the egali tarian 
model. the C.E.A. 's spending limits became unassailable. 
T he Court's majority opinion also asked the wrong question to 
enhance Libman's status at the expense of Thomson Newspapers and 
Figueroa. T he issue in Harper II was not wheLher Lhe Court an<.I Parlia-
ment agree that the right to participate should be limited to promote an 
egalitarian model. The Charter docs not ask the Court Lo place its insti-
cutional weight on one side of that question or the OLher. The issue instead 
was whether the government could demonstrate that the risks associated 
with third party spending were sufficient to justi fy an egal i tarian model 
Lhat devalued rights of participation that are protected by section 2(b). 
In the circumstances, Figueroa's principle of meaningful partici-
pation posed an obstadc which had Lo be explained away. To avoid Lhe 
force of facohucci J. 's uninh ihiled language, Bastarache J. declared that 
Figueroa did not apply in Harper because section 3's rights of partici -
pation cannot he claimed under section 2(b). Yet if the statutory prov i-
sions that disadvantaged smaller parties compromised the rights of vot-
ers in Figueroa, it would he impossible for limits which directly prohibit 
individuals from playing a role in election debate not LO constitute a 
more serious interference wi th rights protected hy section 2(b)'s guar-
antee of expressive freedom. 
98 f-larper, supra, nolc 2. Sec C. Fcasby, "Issue Advocacy and Third Patties in 
the United Kingdom and Canada" (2003), 48 McGill L.J. I (discussing Harper 
and third party spending limils). 
99 Ibid., al para. 62. 
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[n refusing lo extend Figueroa's logic to section 2(b ), Bastarache J. 
suggested that third party adverlising is inconsistent wi th section J's 
concept of meaningful participation because " the unequal dissemination 
of points of view underm ines the voter's abi l ity Lo be adequately in-
formed or all views". HMi Though it was not substantiated, his posi tion 
was that information does not ass ist, but interferes wi th, the freedom of 
an informed voter. The loosely connected logic of that argument is that 
voters can only be informed when voices arc equal, and that third pany 
invol vement undercuts the informed and therefore meaningful partici-
pation of voters. In making that argument Bastarache J. assumed that 
the voter's perception would be clouded by too much information from 
diverse and unequal sources. Yet Harper's protectionist geslures in this 
context recal l Gonthier J.'s willingness in Thomson Newspapers to pro-
tect voters from poor poll ing i nformation which might d istract and 
confuse them in similar ways. There, however, Bastarache J . had retorted 
that "the Canadian voter is a rational actor who can learn from experience 
and make independent judgments aboul lhc value of parlicular sources 
or electoral information" .1111 
Bastarache J .conceded that spending limiLs which arc overly restric-
tive can undermine the informational componenl of section 3, but added 
that meaningful participation does nol include lhe rreedom lo conducl a 
campaign thal might determine the oulcome. 1112 This also contradicts 
Figueroa, which held that parlicipalion has an intrinsic va lue independ-
ent of its impact on the election outcome. w~ The issue in Harper was 
not whclhcr lhird parties have a constitutional right to determine the 
outcome of an election; the question was whether they have a right lo 
participate, whether their impacl is small or large. Y cl the majority 
opinion drove a wedge between the volcr' s section 3 rights and section 
2(b)'s guaramee of expressi ve freedom. Under that view, third party 
participation erodes rather than promotes meaning fu l participation under 
section 3. Put diffe re ntly, democratic pa rticipation under section 2(h) is 
ini mical to the interests of voters. Whatever the merits of that view, 
Bastarache J. st ill failed lo explain why section 3's guarantee is para-
mount over section 2(b), either in principle or in this conlcxl. 
His majority opinion also rendered the evidence meaningless hy 
insisting that the Court was required to choose between the egalitarian 
I 00 Ibid., at pam 72. 
I 0 I Thomson NewspaJ>ers, supra, note 52, at 956. 
I 02 Harper, supra, note 2, at para. 74. 
103 Supra,notc92. 
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model and unlimited righLs of participalion. Thus he maintained that 
those who have access to the most resources will monopolize the election 
discourse and undermine the voter ' s ability Lo be adequately informed 
of all vicws.104 This observation supported the conclusion that section 3 
docs not guarantee a right to unlimited information or unlimited partic-
ipation.105 But Harper did not force the Court to choose between a $3,000 
l imi t and no limit whatsoever. By referring throughout the opinion to 
the problem of "unlimited third party advertising", Bastarache J. framed 
the analysis as though there were only two choices. '°6 The question 
before the Court was not whether restrictions on third party adve11ising 
are per se unconstitutional but whether the particular l imit chosen by 
Parliament - $3,000 per electoral district and $ 150,000 nationally - was 
justifiable under section 1. 
In answer to that question and in contrast to the methodology he 
applied in Thomson Newspapers, Bastarache J. brushed quickly over 
discussion or the expressive activity at stake, noling only that third party 
advertising enriches the political discourse and lies at che core or section 
2(b)_ un Though he had li ttle choice but to concede lhe point, his reasons 
make it clear Lhat he auached lillle or no value LO the right of Lhird panics 
to participate in election debate. Once having accepted thal it would 
normally be entitled to a high degree of constitutional protection, Bas-
tarache J. stated that "third party advertising w ill be less deserv ing of 
consticucional protection" in some circumsLances.10i1 
Again in contrast to Thomson Newspapers, where he explai ned why 
deference was inappropriaLe, Baslarache J. held in Harper that the Court 
should defer to Parliament. Third party spending invited that approach, 
he said, because Parl iament has the right to choose Canada's electoral 
model and to address any nuances in its implementation .U19 Without 
specifically relying on the con textual approach as it evolved in the 
section 2(b) jurisprudence of the 1990s, he relied on undisclosed " con-
tex tual factors" to support a deferential version of the section I analy-
I 04 llarper, supra, note 2, al parn. 72. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., at paras. 97, 107, and 121. 
107 Ibid., at para 84. 
108 Ibid., at para 85. 
109 ibid.. al para. 87. 
110 Ibid. , al para. 88. For instance, in undertaking 1he minimal impairment anal-
ysis, Bastarache J. stated th al "the contextual factors indicate that the Co wt 
should afford deference to the balance Parliament has struck between political 
expression and meaningful participation in the elec1oral process". Ibid., at 
para. 111. 
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sis. 1 10 Apart from undisguised support for the ega litarian model, it is 
unclear which conlexLUal facLOrs invi ted this need for deference. 
Once dcfcn.:ncc was in place, Bastarache J . sought lo explain how 
Parliament's spending l imits cou ld be regarded as reasonable when there 
was no evidence that third party participation would harm the electoral 
process. There, too, he could not avoid admitting that " rtJhcrc is no 
evidence .. . lhal third pany advertising seeks LO be manipulative" .' " 
Nor was there evidence that " third patties wish to use their advertising 
dollars to smear candidates or engage in other forms of non-political 
discourse". 112 In the absence of recent, documented evidence, Bastarache 
J. reprimanded the lower courts for discounting the Lortie Report, which 
he touted as the "central piece in the cv identiary record establishing the 
possible harm engendered by uncontrolled third party advenising". 11 ~ 
At hest, he was able to say that without limits, electoral fairness is "a 
real possibility". 11 4 
The moment of truth in the majority opinion is found in the statement 
that "r shirely, Parliament does nol have to wai t for the feared harm to 
occur before it can enact measures to prevenl the posshility of harm 
occurring or to remedy the harm, should it occur.""~ In hlunt terms, this 
means that the evidence docs not matter, and that limits on constitutional 
rights arc rcasonahle and j ustifiable whether or not the government can 
show that exercising of the right poses an articulated or art iculable harm. 
It is a remarkable statement at large, and one that is as worrying as ii is 
surprising in this context. Hwper If is yet more extraordinary against 
the background of the Thomson Newspapers methodology and Figu-
eroa's principle of meaningful participation. It is as transparent as it is 
inescapable that the majority opinion is an example of result-based 
decision making. Bastarache }. could not uphold the limit on third pa rty 
spendi ng without ignoring the Court's decisions on participation, and 
ahandoni ng the methodology of Thomson Newspapers and other sect ion 
2(b) ca~cs . 
I I I Ibid., at para. 85 (emphasis added). 
I I 2 Ibid., (emphasis i n o rig ina l). 
11 3 Ibid., at para. 94 (emphasis added). 
11 4 Ibid., al para. 99. 
I 15 Ibid. , at para. 98 (emphasis added). 
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(d) Participation and the Equal Voice of Each Citizen 
The majori Ly opinion's unmasked supporl for the egalitarian model, 
in combination with its lack of respect for an evidence-based method-
ology under section I , invited dissent. T he Chief Justice and Major J. 
obl iged hy writingajoint minority opinion, in which BinnicJ. concurred. 
They maintained thal it was not necessary to choose between and Fi-
gueroa, because Parliament's spending limits were unconstitutional for 
lhe same reasons Quebec's scheme had been invalidated. As they ex-
plained, "the incursion essentia lly denies free expression and far sur-
passes what is required lo meet the perceived chreat that c itizen speech 
will drown out other political discourse". 116 In Libman, the Court held 
that the restrictions were so severe that they came close lo being a total 
ban. The Chief J us ti cc and Major J. stated that Harper was indisting ui sh.-
able on that poi nt: the situation was "precisely the same" as in Libman, 
because "[i]l is not an exaggerntion to say chat the [CEA 's] limits on 
c itizens amount to a vi nual ban on their partici pation in political debate 
duri ng the e lection period". 117 
Unlike Bastarache J., who barely mentioned it, the joinL dissent 
focused on the severity of the violation. To them the meagerness of 
Parliament's $3,000 allowance represented a serious incursion on free 
expression in the political realm, because it effectively denied the right 
of an ordinary c itizen to give meaningful and effective expression lo her 
political views during a federal e lection campaign.11x Parliament' s pro-
vis ions set advertising limits for c itizens at such low levels tha t they 
"cannot effectively communicate with their fe llow citizens on e lection 
issues during an election campaign". 119 As a resu lt, "effecti ve local, 
regional and national expression of ideas becomes the exclusive righ1 of 
registered poli1ica l parties and their candidates". 120 For them it was 
problematic that under Parliamcnl's regime, "the on ly sustained mes-
sages voters sec and hear during the course of an e lection campaign are 
from political parties". 12 1 
It is clear that the dissenting judges fou nd tha t result offensive to 
democratic values and to the Charter principle that political expression 
11 6 Ibid., at para 2 (citing Libman). 
11 7 Ibid. , at para 35. 
11 8 Ibid., at para. I . 
119 Ibid. , at para 2. 
120 Ibid. , al pa1·a 7 (emphasis added). 
121 Ibid. , at para. 19. 
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is " the single most imporlant and proleclcd lypc of exprcssion". 122 Jn 
their v iew, it was impermissible for Parliament lo advance or protect the 
interests or registered polilical parties at the expense of seclion 2(h), 
which guarantees "an equal voice lo each citizen". 123 T he guaranlee 
embraces lhc righl of lhe speaker lo communicale w ilh members of the 
eleclOrate, as well as l hc right of voters to l isten and to have access to 
the commentary, perspecti ve, and opinions or fellow citi zens. 
Not only did lhe dissent challenge the proposition that third part ics 
do not have the same rights of participation as political parties, it rej ected 
the majority opinion's conclusion that non-party participation is inimical 
10 the rights or voters under section 3. To the contrary, the Chief Justice 
and M ajor J. explained that voters have a consti tutionally protccled right, 
not only under Figueroa but under the section 2(h) jurisprudence as 
well, to hear the speaker's message. They regarded the interests or the 
section 3 voter and the section 2(h) participants as compatible, not 
incompatible, as the majority opinion conlendcd. Moreover, they said it 
was no answer to spending limits that ci tizens remain free to speak 
through a registered political party. Citizens are entitled to communicate 
with fcl low volers dircclly, and the r ighl lo do so is "essential to the 
effective dcbale upon which our democracy rests, and lies at the core of 
the free expression guarantee". 124 For those reasons, the dissenting 
j udges r~jccted deference and stated that limits on such a fundamental 
right must be supported by "a clear and convincing demonstra1ion that 
they arc necessary, do not go too far, and enhance more than harm the 
dcmocral ic process". 125 
Under section I, the Chief Justice and Major J. admonished the 
federal government for failing to adduce evidence that third patty spend-
ing is harmful; as they explained, 1hc Attorney General had not shown 
"any real problem requiring rectification". 12'' Instead, and in the absence 
of evidence that wealthier Canadians would dominate debate, "ltlhe 
Jangcrs posilc<l I were] who lly hypolhclica l". 127 With a hint of sarcasm , 
the dissent suggested that if wealthy Canadians were " poised to hijack 
this rnuntry's clcc1ion process, an expectation 4some evidence to that 
e}lect is reasonable" .128 Despite the A tlorney General' s assc11ions of 
122 Ibid. , at para 11. 
123 /bid.,atpara. 13. 
124 Ibid., at para. 2 1. 
125 Ibid., (i.:mphasis added). 
126 Ibid., at para. 34. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. , (emphasis added). 
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necessity, the legislation could only be regarde<l as a serious "overre-
action Lo a non-cxisten1 problem". 129 
The dissent went on Lo dismiss the suggestion that such draconian 
limits arc req uired lo meet the "perceived dangers of inequality, an 
uninformed electorate, and a public perception that the system is un-
fair". Do To the conlrary, lhe judges speculated thal the limits cou ld 
exacerbate those dangers, produce an electorate that is less well informed 
and - by si lenc ing those citizens who would otherwise participate -
contribute to a perception that the e lection process is unfair. Not only 
did the dissent regard the possible benefits of the limit as illusory, it 
c laimed that the measures "may actuall y cause more inequality, Jess 
civic engagement and greater disrepute than they avoid". 1 ~ 1 In conclud-
ing, the C hief Justice and Major J. spoke in pique of the chilling effect 
the limits would have on political expression, forcing citizens into a 
Hobson' s choice bet ween not speaki ng at a l I during an e lection or having 
their voices reduced to a mere whisper. in 
(e) Conclusion 
The egal itarian model prevai led in Harper v. Canada (Attorney 
General), though not without stiff resislan<.:e from members of the Court 
who saw Parliament' s nominal spending allowance as a serious inter-
forence with a sacred Charter entitlement the right to partic ipace in the 
democratic e lection of a nat.ional government. As shown above, the 
majority opinion openly supported the egalitarian model, but could not 
uphold Parliament's limits under the existing law and record without 
abandoning its commitment to principled decision making. Bastarache 
J. reduced section 1 's evidentiary requirements lO the point of disap-
pearance to uphold limils on expressive activity that was patently val-
uable in nature and not proven harmful. 
As such, Harper is in contrad iction with the Court 's key precedents 
on the Charter and the e lectoral process. As the dissent maintained, 
Harper did not force the Court to choose bet ween Libman and Figueroa. 
In the context of a national election, Parliament's limit effectively si-
lenced third parties and in functional terms amounted to a virtual ban 
129 Ibid., at paras. 34, 35. 
130 Ibid., al para. 38. 
131 Ibid. , at parn. 42. 
132 Ibid. 
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on participation. From that perspective, it was unconstitutional for the 
same reasons Quebec's scheme was unconstitutional in Libman. 
But the majority's approm.:h also abandoned the methodology of 
Thomson Newspapers, and contrived a conflict between the rights of 
voters and the rights of would-he participants to avoid Figueroa's prin-
ciple of meaningful participation. As already mentioned, Thomson 
Newspapers is one of the Court's most principled section 2(b) decisions. 
There, the majority opinion considered the nature of the infringement 
and the value of the activity before concluding that deference to Parlia-
ment was unwarranted in the circumstances; in addition, it looked at the 
evidence of harm in some detail before deciding that the 72 hour opinion 
poll blackout was unconstitutional. For its inattention to the requisite 
clements of analysis, Harper II stands regrettably but unapologetically 
in contrast. Likewise, the majority opinion in Harper had to find a way 
of dismissing Figueroa's concept of meaningful participation because 
that principle posed an obstacle lo the egalitarian model. There, Harper 
drove a wedge between participation under section 3 and participation 
under section 2(b) by declaring that the two are incompatible. This 
facilitated the conclusion that limits could be imposed on expressive 
activity to prevent the voter's meaningful participation from being com-
promised by the unmcaningful participation of section 2(b) claimants. 
It is worrying that in Harper the Court sanctioned the silencing of 
third party participants. The more serious problem, however, is that the 
end justified the means: it was the end point or result that mattered to 
the majority and not the means or discipline of constitutional analysis. 
Though it should be the other way around, whenever methodology is in 
conflict with an outcome the Court wants to endorse, methodology is 
too often abandoned to avoid a result that is required by principled 
analysis and respect for the evidence. 
4. A MODEL OF GOVERNANCE FOR SECTION 2(b) 
In Vancouver Sun the Court held that the presumption of openness 
applies to various stages of proceedings under section 83.28, and that 
derogations arc unacceptable unless justified under the standard. As a 
matter of methodology, the majority opinion reviewed the underlying 
values of the open court principle, contextualized those values to section 
83.28 hearings, and then applied an evidence-based standard to the 
question of exceptions. This approach is exemplary because it reinforced 
the underlying values of the principle in the selling of investigative 
hearings, and then made derogations conditional on the evidence. In 
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doing so, the majority opinion did not flinch from a commitment to 
principle that unquestionably makes it more difficult for the state to 
conduct investigative hearings under section 83.28. 
By contrast, the majority opinion in Harper v. Canada (Attorney 
General) was designed to diminish and negate section 2(b)'s guarantee 
of expressive freedom, as well as to avoid testing the permissibility of 
third party spending limits fairly, on the basis of the evidence. In Van-
couver Sun the Court endorsed open court's constitutional status as a 
core value. The same point about democratic participation was conceded 
in Harper but not given significance in the analysis. Whereas Vancouver 
Sun refused to retreat from a presumption of openness, Harper v. Canada 
(Attorney General) did not accept that a similar presumption should 
apply to expression at the core of democratic government. Third party 
spending limits did not warrant serious scrutiny under section 1 because 
the majority opinion declared, instead, that the Court should defer to 
Parliament. Finally, Vancouver Sun applied an evidence-based standard 
to the question whether exceptions can be justified at various points in 
a section 83.28 proceeding. To compare, the majority opinion in Harper 
was evasive on that question and chose to uphold third party spending 
limits which were not demonstrably justified under section I. 
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General) is a good example of the 
worst the section 2(b) jurisprudence has to offer: it is a decision that 
does not rest on principle but is based on instinctive, reflexive, ad hoc 
considerations. A system of governance is unimportant in such circum-
stances, because what matters is the result. Rules and principles of 
governance which stand in the way of that result arc a nuisance that must 
be disregarded. As the Introduction suggested, this style of decision 
making is anarchistic because it is rule and principle-averse; for that 
reason it is unacceptable and can only damage the Court's credibility. 
As well, it is unnecessary: as decisions like Thomson Newspapers Co. 
v. Canada (Attorney General) demonstrate, the Court has developed a 
system of governance for other section 2(h) issues that is akin to the 
open court model. It simply has to follow that system from issue to issue 
and case to case, as a matter of principle. 
That model has the same three elements: it affirms section 2(b)'s 
underlying values, regardless of the context; it incorporates those values 
into a standard that docs not allow them to be easily displaced; and it 
makes any limits on expressive activity conditional on section 1 's evi-
dentiary requirements. Three points or further suggestions can be added 
to the basic framework. The first is that - as with the open court model 
- the section 1 analysis in other section 2(h) cases should he informed 
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at the outset by a presumption specifically in favour of content neutrality, 
or of the entitlement generally when content neutrality is not in issue. 
Second, section 2(b )' s underlying values an<l the elements of the analysis 
should be constant, an<l should not shift with subjective perceptions of 
the expressive activity al stake. For example, the exacting scrutiny of 
Thomson Newspapers cannot stand alongside the undue deference of 
Harper, when participation in the democratic process is the issue in both 
cases. And third, the requirement that limits on constitutionally protected 
activity be supported by evidence of harm must be taken seriously. Nol 
to do so makes a mockery of the s. I analysis. 
Subject to those qualifications, a model of governance is in place, 
and needs only to be followed. Not to <lo so in all s.2(b) decision making 
will perpetuate the contradictions and double standards that a compari-
son of Vancouver Sun an<l Harper reveals; not lo <lo so will also per-
petuate the methodological anarchy that identifies Harper, unfortu-
nately, as the new low point in the s.2(h) jurisprudence. 
